

Message Text

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15

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 IO-14 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20

RSC-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 L-03 PRS-01

ACDA-19 DRC-01 AF-10 SAM-01 /135 W

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P 270600Z APR 74

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0926

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 0252

DEPT PASS ALL ARAB CAPITALS AND ANKARA, LONDON,
MOSCOW, PARIS, TEHRAN, AND TEL AVIV

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: IRAQ ASKS FOR ARAB SUPPORT AGAINST KURDS

1. ON APRIL 20 ARAB CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE CALLED IN TO MFA
TO MEET WITH UNDER SECRETARY ABDUL HUSSEIN AL-JAMALI. ACCORDING
TO ACCOUNTS GIVEN ME BY EGYPTIAN CHARGE BARAKA AND FRENCH
COUNSELOR SAILLARD (FROM MAGHREB AMBASSADORS) FOLLOWING EXCHANGE
TOOK PLACE:

2. JAMALI REVIEWED KURDISH PROBLEM STATING THAT IRAQ HAD
TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED IT AN INTERNAL PROBLEM. (THIS
CONFIRMED BY TURKISH AMBASSADOR CUHRUK WHO TOLD ME RECENTLY
THAT GOI HAD NEVER DISCUSSED KURDISH ISSUE WITH HIM OR TURKISH
GOVERNMENT. ON ONE OCCASION WHEN HE HAD MENTIONED KURDS TO
HIGH IRAQI OFFICIAL SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, IRAQI HAD RESPONDED
THAT IT STRICTLY INTERNAL PROBLEM.) JAMALI HAD GONE ON TO SAY
THAT RECENT KURDISH STATEMENTS CALLING FOR INDEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE HAD INTERNATIONALIZED PROBLEM AND GOI NOW WISHED
TO HAVE SUPPORT OF ARAB STATES IN RESOLVING PROBLEM. VERY
SPIRITED TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR DISCUSSION FOLLOWED.

3. EGYPTIAN CHARGE HAD QUESTIONED JAMALI ON EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN
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SUPPORT FOR KURDS. JAMALI HAD MENTIONED SAUDI MONEY AND IRANIAN

AND AMERICAN ARMS, BUT SAID "THEY ARE TOO CLEVER" TO DO SO OPENLY AND HARD EVIDENCE LACKING. SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED ACCUSATION, BUT OTHERWISE HAD NOTHING TO SAY. TUNISIAN CHARGE HAD ASKED POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW IRAQ COULD EXPECT SUPPORT OF ARAB STATES WHEN IT HAD ATTACKED THEM IN PAST AND WHEN IT HAD ADMITTED COMMUNIST PARTY TO NATIONAL FRONT. JAMALI HAD REPLIED THAT ADMISSION OF CPI DIDN'T MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF COMMUNIST IDEAS, BUT WAS TACTICAL NECESSITY.

4. ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR OTHMANE SAADI HAD SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK AS AN ALGERIAN, A BERBER AND A REVOLUTIONARY. HE SAID ALGERIA COULD NEVER PUBLICLY SUPPORT KURDISH AUTONOMY BECAUSE OF ITS BERBER MINORITY. MAXIMUM HE THOUGHT GOA COULD DO WAS STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. SUDANESE AMB MUSA MUSTAFA HAD REFERRED TO SOUTHERN SUDANESE PROBLEM AND MADE STRONG CASE FOR IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING KURDISH PROBLEM BY MILITARY MEANS. HE HAD ASKED WHETHER IRAQ TRULY COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION. JAMALI EMPHATICALLY SAID YES. YAR AMB AL-MARWANI THEN SUGGESTED THAT, SINCE MAJOR PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE WITH IRAN, IRAQ MAKE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS WITH IRAN. JAMALI HAD REPLIED THAT IRAQ HAD TRIED, RECENTLY, BUT NEGOTIATIONS HAD HAD NO POSITIVE RESULTS. (POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO UNSYG REP MUNOZ MEDIATION. BAGHDAD 241)

5. ALTHOUGH IT TAKEN FOR GRANTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS, IDEAS DISCUSSED FOR JOINT ARAB ACTIONS INCLUDED ARAB PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, JOINT DEMARCHE TO TEHRAN, AND MEDIATION BETWEEN KURDS AND GOI AND GOI AND IRAN.

6. COMMENT: GENERAL REACTION TO IRAQI REQUEST FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED WHICH IS PROBABLY GOOD REFLECTION OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD DOING SOMETHING FOR BAGHDAD REGIME. EGYPTIANS MAY ATTEMPT SOME KIND OF EFFORT, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY TAKE BROADER VIEW OF AREA THAN MOST AND RECOGNIZE, JUSTIFIABLY IN MY VIEW, THAT CURRENT IRAQI REGIME IS BEST ONE CAN EXPECT AT THIS TIME AND ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR WOULD PROBABLY MEAN RETURN TO CHAOS.
LOWRIE

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NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MINORITIES, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, POLITICAL SITUATION, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BAGHDA00252
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740100-0790
From: BAGHDAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974048/aaaaahbw.tel
Line Count: 107
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 APR 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <25 FEB 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IRAQ ASKS FOR ARAB SUPPORT AGAINST KURDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IZ, XF, (JAMALI, ABDUL HUSSEIN AL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005